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Abstract This paper analyses the Chinese quest for energy resources in Latin
America, arguing that the strengthening of relations in this sector can only be
explained by a conjunction of interests on both sides. Looking at the presence of
Chinese national oil companies in the regional energy sector, we show that China’s
incursion has allowed the region to shift its traditional energy partners, introducing a
factor of change into economic and political relations with geopolitical implications
for the regional arena.
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Introduction
The importance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an international actor
today is unquestionable. Its emergence goes well beyond the economic field. In
addition to its prominence in commercial terms, China has consolidated its military
power and actively developed diplomatic relations with Asian, African and Latin
American countries, as well as strategic partnerships in Europe. Since the
implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
there have been regular mutual visits between Chinese and Latin American leaders,
followed by growing bilateral trade. China’s imports from and exports to Latin
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America, continuously increasing since the 1990s, have reached unprecedented
figures from 2002 onwards. The Chinese diplomacy has been more active than ever
in the region, especially from that year on, as a consequence of the change of
priorities in United States foreign policy away from its traditional ‘backyard’, due to
the impact of the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the launch of the war against
international terrorism.
The PRC pursues a double objective in the region: first, it aims at getting Latin
American countries which continue to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan to
switch their recognition over to the Mainland, while strengthening ties with those
who have already done so; second, it seeks natural resources to feed the growing
needs of its economy. Hence, owing to its great market potential and based on the
principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, so far Chinese leaders
have been welcomed in the region.
This paper argues that China’s domestic priority of maintaining the present rate of
economic growth makes the PRC increasingly dependent on Latin American energy
resources. Thus, we focus on the relationship between China and some Latin
American countries in the energy sector. Questioning if this relationship can be
considered as mutually beneficial, the paper analyses China’s main interests in the
region and evaluates Latin America’s reasons for welcoming this new Chinese
diplomacy, suggesting the consequences for regional geopolitics.
The Chinese Approach to Latin America
This section looks at how China’s external policy, conditioned by internal priorities,
namely political stability, economic growth and regional security, has drawn
attention to Latin America, a region previously almost ignored. Internal political
stability, a major concern of the Chinese government, is maintained through the use
of nationalism (as an instrument promoting the national unity) and continuing
economic growth, which, internally, has served as a source of legitimacy for the
Chinese Communist Party, both because the population’s standard of living has
improved substantially and because it is a source of national pride, and thus feeds
nationalism (48, p. 54). Externally, this growth is the basis for the emergence of
China as an international great power (53, p. 82).
Thus, the priority of maintaining the present rates of economic growth makes the
PRC increasingly dependent on foreign resources, namely from Central Asia, Africa
and Latin America. In this sense, the objectives leading Chinese politics towards
Latin America derive directly from the priorities of foreign policy. Leaving aside
here the concern about regional security, China seeks the strengthening of the state
by maintaining its economic growth and promoting nationalism, and therefore
defends territory integrity and, at the same time, tries to achieve a greater relevance
in the international scene [34]. The goal of strengthening the state is translated into
the necessity of maintaining the political regime, which is undoubtedly linked to
economic development. Therefore, it is urgent to secure suppliers of raw materials
and markets for its products; Latin America offers China both.
To feed its vertiginous growth China relies on imports: it buys from other
countries 30% of the oil it consumes, 45% of the iron, 44% of other non-ferrous
minerals and a very high proportion of agricultural products. Thus, it has become the
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main world consumer of copper, tin, zinc, platinum, steel and iron. It occupies the
second place in the ranks of world consumption for oil, aluminium, lead and soya;
third for nickel; and fourth for gold (44, p. 17). In this context, Latin America
appears as an interesting area for China, since it is an important producer of these
key products essential for satisfying China’s internal needs. This region is extremely
rich in natural resources. At the same time, it produces several commodities which
are facing a huge increase in demand in China. Moreover, in some sectors, the
region represents an interesting market for Chinese exports. These factors have lead
to a rapprochement between China and the countries of the region in order for China
to establish commercial and political ties.
While in 1990 the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean sold to China
just 0.7% of their exports, in 2005 they sold to China 3% of the exported total,
becoming its main supplier of soya, nickel, iron, copper, fishmeal and other primary
products. However, the regional distribution is uneven: while Mercosur sold 6.3% of
its exports to China, for Chile the number was 11% and for Peru and Cuba, 10% [8].
For China, purchases in Latin America are also very relevant. The Asian country
buys 60% of the soya produced in the region (mainly from Brazil and Argentina),
80% of the fishmeal (from Peru and Chile), 69% of the remains of poultry (from
Argentina and Brazil) and 45% of the wines and grapes (from Chile). This fact
shows not only the comparative advantages of the region but also the potential of the
Chinese market for Latin American producers.
Hence, not surprisingly, similar to the Chinese white paper on Africa published in
2006, a white paper on Latin America and the Caribbean was released in 2008 by
Beijing, identifying political, economic, cultural/social and security/judicial cooper-
ation as the four major dimensions of its involvement in the region [27].
Beijing has been using trade, official development assistance (ODA) and foreign
direct investment (FDI) as instruments to strengthen bilateral relations with its
suppliers of natural resources in Latin America. As mentioned above, bilateral trade
has achieved unprecedented levels in recent years. China refers to ODA as assistance
to developing countries and provides different types of aid than that usually framed
by ODA, mainly building infrastructure in areas of Chinese interests. Regarding
FDI, from January to November 2004, Beijing invested in the region around $889
million, representing a 49.3% share of the total Chinese foreign direct investment
[10]. These investments are mainly in agriculture and in industries related to raw
materials, as well as in the building of infrastructure.
The growing number of Chinese high-level visits to Latin American countries
also reflects the importance that Beijing has given this region, attempting to secure
long-term access to energy resources. During his first visit to Latin America in
November 2004, President Hu Jintao passed through Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Cuba; in 2005 he visited Mexico; and in 2008 Cuba, Costa Rica and Peru. Other
examples of these high-level exchanges are the visits to China of the Brazilian
President Lula da Silva in May 2004, celebrating the 30th anniversary of bilateral
relations, and of President Hugo Chavez in September 2008, signing agreements
involving the import of Chinese military equipment in exchange for an increase in
Venezuela’s oil exports to China.
Regarding the search for natural resources, there is no doubt that energy is
one of the most important sectors China has focused on its approach to the Latin
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American economy, since it is a crucial area to ensure economic growth, as we
will analyse next.
China’s Internal Needs and the Quest for Energy
Since the late 1990s, Beijing has been reframing its foreign policy according to its
domestic priorities, namely economic growth [38], and one of its greatest internal
challenges lies in the fact that its natural resources are insufficient (54, p. 21). As
early as 1993, China began to import oil when consumption surpassed local
production for the first time. As the second largest oil consumer after the United
States since 2003 [24], China’s fuel demand is increasing rapidly. Although coal—of
which China has important reserves—represents 70% of Chinese consumption and
oil only 20% [24], the need for the latter is growing quickly. This is not only due to
industrial development but also to the fact that oil is the main fuel used for
transportation—a sector whose share of total oil consumption is growing fast [45]. In
the 1996–2006 period, the length of China’s highways grew at an average of 11.3%
per year, while over the same period passenger miles travelled and ton-miles of
highway freight travel showed annual increases of 7.5 and 6.9% respectively.
Moreover, estimates point out that Chinese fuel consumption for the 2006–2030
period should increase by 4.8% per year for passenger transportation and 5.2% per
year for freight transportation [26].
According to the International Energy Agency, despite the impact of the credit
crisis on world economic growth prospects, the overall trends pointed out the
previous year remain broadly unchanged [31]. Thus, China’s sheer market size and
stronger economic growth prospects are still bound to increase energy demand
towards 2030, dwarfing all other countries and regions. In fact, it is forecast that for
the Reference Scenario 2007–2030, China will be responsible for 43% of the global
oil demand increase, which will belong entirely to the non-OECD countries [30].
The Chinese dependence on this region will grow, at least as long as it doesn’t develop
its own refining capacity to allow for processing other types of oil (52, p. 183). The
PRC will be, in 2030, the second largest energy consumer, only preceded by the
OECD countries combined. As for trade, interregional oil trade is expected to
increase sharply in the period 2005–2030, increasing the gap between local
production and demand in all regions. Following these estimates, the main increase
in net exports will take place in the Middle East, while all transition economies,
namely in Africa and Latin America, will also export more oil. Meanwhile, imports
to China and India will increase [29].
Historically, China has sought self-sufficiency. Hence, since the 1950s, it has
carried out a policy of intensive prospecting of its own reserves, both of gas and of
oil. In the 1980s, it followed the same trend, but this time partially opened its oil
sector to foreign investment, with the objective of guaranteeing a steady production
level. The Chinese State Planning Commission admitted in 1986 that the country
would lose its self-sufficiency in oil [5]. Consequently, since the 1990s, the Chinese
national oil companies (NOCs) have headed towards other regions in search of the
valued resource. Indeed, since China is not energy self-sufficient, the Chinese
authorities aim at diversifying the supplies in order to achieve a bigger cushion in
case of any significant shock in the Middle East, its main supplier.
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As a matter of fact, between 1998 and 2003, about 60% of the Chinese crude
imports originated in the Middle East. However, due to the instability in the region
and the increasing American presence after the launch of the ‘War on Terror’,
Beijing diversified its energy supply, approaching other areas such as Central Asia,
Africa and Latin America [28]. Thus, by 2008, although the Middle East remained
the largest source of China’s oil imports, its share had declined. According to
FACTS Global Energy cited by the EIA, in 2008 about 50% came from that region,
and about 20% came from Africa. Russia and Kazakhstan were the origin of about
10% of Chinese oil imports and Latin America, the origin of about 3.5% [25].
Nevertheless, this aim of diversification of suppliers may also be explained by
other factors. First, supply derived from the Persian Gulf must cross the Indian
Ocean, passing through the trouble spots of the Strait of Malacca and the South
China Sea. Second, the PRC currently depends on foreign oil ships as it aims to
develop its own fleet. Moreover, in case of conflict with Taiwan, an international
blockade may be enforced on China [2]. All these factors have encouraged the
search for new energy sources.
Despite the growing importance of energy issues for Chinese domestic and
foreign policy agendas, it must be said that the country’s energy sector has not been
effectively managed so far. As Downs points out [7], the multiplicity of energy-
related agencies, the lack of a leading authority and the scarcity of funding have
frustrated the formulation, implementation and enforcement of energy policies.
However, this situation contrasts with the activism of China’s state-owned energy
companies. These NOCs are powerful and quite autonomous actors1 that, in practice,
lead major energy projects and policies. This holds true especially with regard to
overseas investments. Thus, despite the launch of a new National Energy
Administration in July 2008 as an attempt to set up an effective national-level
energy institution to act as the key energy regulator for the country and the recent
announcement of the establishment of a new government agency, the National
Energy Commission, to take charge of the country’s energy policy [20], China’s
demand for energy resources within the international realm can be better assessed by
looking at the activities of its NOCs abroad.
In this regard, to contribute to guaranteeing China’s energy security, the Chinese
companies decided to explore regions of the world which until now have been
almost completely ignored as energy suppliers. Thus, in Africa, China’s presence is
noticeable in Sudan, Libya, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Gabon, San Tome and Prince
and Angola, which became its main oil supplier, even surpassing Saudi Arabia [43].
A similar situation has taken place in Latin America, which will be analysed in more
detail in the next section.
The Chinese Presence in the Latin American Energy Sector
The previous section argued that in order to find energetic resources to feed its
economic growth, China has been showing an increasing interest in establishing
1 According to Downs, ‘their influence stems from their full and vice ministerial ranking, membership of
key executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), industry expertise,
internationally listed subsidiaries, and profitability’. See (7, p. 42).
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trade relations with Latin America. Why? Proven oil reserves data show that 62% of
the total is situated in the Middle East, while Africa, the former USSR, and Latin
America together with the Caribbean account for 10% each. Given the fact that, as
mentioned above, most Chinese oil imports come from the Middle East, it is clear
that the strategy of diversifying suppliers should focus especially on each of these
three regions [31].
Within the Latin American region, oil reserves are unevenly distributed.
Venezuela is the best endowed country, with 71% of the proven reserves. Mexico
and Brazil follow with a share of 10% each, whereas Ecuador and Argentina have 4
and 2% respectively. Other countries account for less than 1% each. Mexico and
Venezuela (with 32 and 31% of the total) are the main producers of the region,
followed by Brazil with a 17% share. Both countries are also the main exporters:
Venezuela exports 40% of the regional total while Mexico accounts for 35%.
Ecuador and Colombia follow, with 7 and 6% respectively. Especially significant is
the fact that the main owners, producers and exporters of oil show negative levels of
oil dependency. In Venezuela (−216.99%), Mexico (−134.22%), Ecuador
(−247.73%) and Colombia (−147.14%) oil production significantly exceeds
consumption, allowing important exports [33].
These figures clearly show the main targets of Chinese investments in the Latin
American energy sector, traditionally oriented to supply the United States and, to a
much lesser extent, Europe. Thus, this section will not carry out an exhaustive
analysis of all these investments since this would exceed the scope of this paper by
far. Instead, it will review some recent and significant facts that highlight the
importance that the main Chinese NOCs are acquiring in Latin American countries.
The China National Off-Shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the China National
Petroleum Company (CNPC)2 and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
(Sinopec) have started to strengthen their presence in the regional energy sector.
They focus both on prospecting for and exploiting resources and on the acquisition
of high-level technology. CNPC, the most important Chinese NOC and the one that
has achieved the largest international reach, being ranked as the world’s fifth top oil
company surpassing BP and Shell [40], is also the main Chinese energy company in
Latin America.
Although the first Chinese incursion in the energy sector in Latin America goes
back to 1994, when a subsidiary company of CNPC purchased the oilfield of Talara,
in Peru [3], the Chinese presence in Latin America has become increasingly
noticeable in recent years. Within the energy sector, this presence is restricted almost
exclusively to the oil sector,3 being concentrated in countries such as Venezuela,
Ecuador, Peru and Mexico. Brazil, although not traditionally an oil exporter, has also
been one of the targets of the Chinese energy diversification policy: it is one of the
world’s main bioethanol producers and its NOC, Petrobras, is one of the main energy
companies of the region. Moreover, promising oil discoveries in deep waters may
boost Brazil’s oil exports.
2 CNPC has an 88% stake in its subsidiary PetroChina, through which it holds an important amount of
assets overseas.
3 This is because, as mentioned above, while China experiences an increasing need for oil to satisfy its
consumption, it is rich in coal and has a low gas consumption. In addition, in the case of gas, liquified
natural gas remains an expensive option.
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In China’s approach to the Latin American oil market, there is no doubt that
Venezuela is the most coveted piece. As proof of this, among other data, is the fact
that CNPC’s American division has been located in that country since 1997. At
present, CNPC is operating two oilfields: the Caracoles oilfield, located in El Tigre,
in the state of Anzoategui (in the Orinoco zone), with a size of 257 km²; and the
Intercampo oilfield, located in Ciudad Ojeda, in the state of Zulia (Maracaibo Lake).
In August 2006, as a result of a governmental decision, the operation of these
oilfields was transformed into a joint venture company between PDVSA4 and
CNPC, with the latter holding a 25% share. According to this company, since it took
over these two old oilfields, peak production has increased from 700 tons per day to
5,500 tons per day [3].
In fact, the Chavez era has given rise to numerous agreements and joint actions
between the Venezuelan NOC and different Chinese companies of the sector as part
of the work of the South American country to reduce the proportion of its oil exports
that goes to the United States. To this end, in 2007 the Venezuelan press announced
an agreement reached by the Venezuelan and Chinese governments to set up mixed
companies between CNPC and PDVSA. One of these companies, Petrozuamo S.A.,
would develop Venezuelan oilfield test drillings. Another would take care of the
development of the Junin 4 Block’s oil production and the third one of the extension
of the MPE3 Block, the production of which would be sent to the Chinese market. In
addition, a company would be constituted to carry out well maintenance and another
one dedicated to crude oil sea transport, which is, as mentioned above, one of the
main factors affecting the security of the Chinese supply. Further, Chino Venezolana
de Taladros S.A. was created by an agreement between PDVSA and the Chinese
Company of Technology and Oil Development. In all of these CNPC-PDVSA mixed
companies, in Venezuela 40% of the capital belongs to the Chinese and 60% to the
Venezuelan company and vice versa in China.
Moreover, the construction of three refineries in China with a refining capacity of
800,000 barrels per day is planned. The agreement takes into consideration CNPC
interests in participating in the gas sector to contribute to the Venezuelan domestic
supply, as well as participating in the assessment of projects in the petrochemical
area.5 The creation of a joint fund to invest in non-oil related plans was also agreed
upon.
On the occasion of the sixth official visit of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
to China, a new oil supply agreement was signed. According to this, Venezuela will
have to increase its exports to the Asian nation in order to fulfil by 2013 the goal of
exporting to China 1 million barrels per day (currently, it exports 380,000 barrels per
day). Furthermore, to diminish the proportion of oil exports that goes to the United
States as quickly as possible, the Venezuelan leader has stated his interest in trying to
reach that level by 2010 [18].
Much more recently, President Chavez and Zhang Ping, Chairman of the
Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, signed several agree-
4 PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.) is a state-owned company, recently ranked in fifth place by the
report The Energy Intelligence Top 100: Ranking the World’s Oil Companies 2008, carried out by the
specialized publication Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. See [17].
5 News appeared in the Venezuelan press, week of March 23rd, 2007.
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ments that strengthen the ‘energy union’ between the two countries [42]. Among
the oil-related agreements, one to set up a mixed company between CNPC and
PDVSA to develop the Cabruta refinery that will refine oil from the Junin Block
8 is especially relevant. It is another Sino-Venezuelan mixed company, Sinopec, in
collaboration with PDVSA, that is going to develop this block. In addition,
CNOOC agreed to help the Venezuelan government carry out quantification and
reserves certification research of the Orinoco Oil Belt’s Boyaca 3 Block [23]. Two
memorandums of agreement were signed in order to carry out off-shore drilling in
deep waters and to allow China’s Development Bank to finance the hydrocarbon
sector projects. In parallel, a mixed Chinese-Venezuelan commission was
established with the aim of undertaking the cooperation programmes established
by both nations in several other agreements [41].
Hence, all evidence points to the strengthening of Chinese-Venezuelan relations
in the energy sector in the coming years as long as the mutual interest—the
diversification of oil imports for China and of exports for Venezuela—persists.
Undoubtedly, this constitutes the cornerstone of the ‘strategic alliance’ established
by the two nations.
The presence of Chinese NOCs in Latin America is also evident in Ecuador,
although only more recently. In fact, it began in August 2003, when CNPC bought
shares of the Lumbaqui Oil company in the oil Block 15 in Amazonia. Andes
Petroleum, owned 55% by CNPC and 45% by Sinopec, bought exploitation rights to
Block 11 (2003), Shiripuno and Tarapoa Block 14 (2004). In 2005, these two
Chinese NOCs purchased all of the oil and gas pipeline assets of the Encana
Canadian company in the country, and in February 2006 CNPC took over those
assets, boosting production and operation progress. Moreover, in that year, four
exploration wells and six appraisal wells were completed by this Chinese NOC.
CNPC also takes part in the business of renting to Petroecuador bits and drilling
equipment through its subsidiary company, Sinopec. In 2007, CNPC had four
drilling and workover crews and one logging crew operating in the country [3]. In
addition, Petroecuador, the Ecuadorian NOC, has promoted a strategic alliance with
Sinopec, and the NOCs Enap (Chile) and Petrobras (Brazil) to boost the exploitation
of the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputuni (ITT) oilfield, situated in the Amazonian
region and with estimated oil reserves of 1,000 million barrels [1, 12].6
As mentioned above, Peru was the first point of disembarkation for Chinese
NOCs in Latin America, in 1993. The Block 6/7 Project in the Talara Oilfield was
the first overseas oilfield development project operated by CNPC. Since then, the
investments of CNPC and its subsidiaries have only grown bigger. For instance, in
July 2003 CNPC signed a cooperation agreement with Pluspetrol on Block 1-AB/8,
owning a 45% stake. Although technical problems limited this block’s production,
the improvement of production management resulted in an improvement of recovery
speed. In fact, in 2007, CNPC’s subsidiary CNPC International (Peru) Ltd.
effectively controlled the rate of water-cut increase problems, speeding up
production by re-injecting wastewater [3]. A short while afterwards, the company
6 It is well worth noting that all these blocks, both the ones already explored by CNPC and those of the
ITT Project, are situated in environmentally sensitive areas where indigenous communities live. Therefore,
there is a heated debate about developing oil exploration activities in the zone. See [1].
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signed a memorandum of understanding with the Peruvian Energy and Mines
Ministry in order to increase cooperation in crude oil and natural gas prospecting and
exploitation as well as in the petrochemical and refining industry.
Finally, one of the most recent investments became a reality in December 2005,
when CNPC signed two new exploitation contracts with Petroperu, covering Blocks
111 and 113, with an approximate surface of 15,200 km² in the southwest of Peru.
Recently, preliminary preparation for the exploration in the two blocks began [3].
More recently, it was reported that CNPC and Sinopec bid between $1.5 billion and
$2.5 billion for Petro-Tech Peruana. This company, which is a subsidiary of the
Offshore International Group, a privately owned American oil and gas company
based in Houston, made Peru’s first offshore oil discovery in 2008 and has also
found natural gas, but may lack the resources to develop two oil and gas fields [14].
Still in the Andean region, Sinopec and the Indian ONGC acquired Omimex in
September 2006, a company with oil and gas operations exclusively in Colombia
[11]. In Bolivia, the country with the second-largest natural gas reserves in South
America, Chinese interests have been more diversified. In December 2004, the
Bolivian government, on behalf of state-owned YPFB and Sinopec’s subsidiary
Shengli Oilfield International Oil Exploit, signed a broad agreement comprising
eight projects in the exploration, exploitation, transportation, refinery and residential
connections areas [39].
In Mexico, the Chinese presence in the sector is not as noticeable as in the
other South American countries mentioned above. Nevertheless, CNPC is a
contractor to Pemex by means of its affiliate Great Wall Drilling Company
(GWDC). In April 2007, the two companies signed a new contract, allowing the
Chinese company to operate two drilling towers of the Mexican company near
Villahermosa, Tabasco. After more than half a decade of successfully operating
non-stop without significant incidents or interruptions, GWDC was congratulated
by Pemex. GWDC signed an extension agreement with the Drilling and
Exploration Department of the Mexican company to continue working in the
south of the country through the end of 2009 [15].
Regarding Brazil, the solvency and importance of its NOC have attracted the
Chinese companies. In fact, several contracts have been signed between the Chinese
NOCs and Petrobras. In May 2004, the latter signed a strategic agreement of
cooperation with Sinopec during the inauguration of the Brazilian company’s
representative office in China. In February 2005, a memorandum of understanding
with CNPC was signed, with the aim of developing joint business with Petrobras.
This cooperation between the Brazilian and the Chinese NOCs also covers the
integrated activities of the oil sector, including refining, pipeline building, and the
prospecting and production of oil resources, both in-shore and off-shore, in Brazil,
China or other places of the world.
Moreover, recently, the Chinese press made known that Sinopec had spoken to
bankers in Beijing and Hong Kong about a possible bid for a stake in the Spanish oil
company Repsol-YPF, which among other important assets has stakes in ultra-deep
off-shore blocks in Brazil’s Santos Basin, where potentially gigantic discoveries
were made during 2008 [6]. Within this framework, in April 2006 Petrobras signed a
contract with Sinopec to build the Cabiunas-Vitoria (Gascav) pipeline, which was
successfully finished in 2007 and began to work in February 2008 [13]. This stretch
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is the first part of Gasene, a network which will supply natural gas to the south-
eastern and north-eastern regions of the country with the aim of increasing the
supply and the transport fuel capacity. Another example of this Sino-Brazilian
cooperation is that, since 2004, Petrobras has been exploiting oil with Sinopec both
in the East China Sea and off the Brazilian shores [9]. In addition, in November
2009, Petrobras signed an agreement with the China Development Bank to receive
$10 billion over a ten year period, while it committed to supply Unipec Asia (a
subsidiary company of Sinopec) with 150,000 barrels the first year and 200,000
barrels per year after that during the same period [19]. In the field of alternative
energies, China has also showed a great interest in the Brazilian development of
bioethanol, thereby promoting scientific exchanges in this domain. Very recently,
Petrobras and Petrochina signed a memorandum of understanding for the
development of research to assess the technical and economic feasibility of
developing joint projects to export ethanol from Brazil to China [22]. In total, all
this evidence points to the fact that current Chinese-Brazilian relations in the energy
sector are clearly experiencing a positive period.
Apart from the investments in the above-mentioned countries, the Chinese NOCs
have also begun to operate in other places that did not sound so interesting at first.
An example of this can be found in the acquisition by CNOOC from Repsol-YPF of
a share of 30% in several oil and gas blocks in Cuba in 2005. In November 2007,
GWDC discovered oil and gas flows in the well COJIMAR-100, located 12 km from
Havana. These flows have an estimated daily yield of more than 400 tonnes and are
situated in the 1,510 m deep K2cp-m layer, which up to that moment was not
believed to have oil or gas [4].
Although Chinese investments in the Latin American energy sector have mainly
targeted upstream activities, downstream initiatives have also begun to be developed
at a good pace, as the aforementioned deals with Petrobras and PDVSA show.
However, there is another example which is well worth noting due to its political
significance. In an official visit to the PRC in October 2007, Costa Rican president
Arias signed an agreement with CNPC to build a refinery in the Central American
country. The idea of such an infrastructure had been launched by Mexican president
Fox, within the framework of the Puebla Panama Plan [36], but Pemex’s decreasing
oil imports as well as political conditions prevented its execution. Thus, this first
agreement gave rise to a second one on the occasion of President Hu Jintao’s visit to
Costa Rica last November. This new 25-year deal between CNPC and Recope
(Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo) is two-sided. First, the joint venture is to help
modernize and expand the Moin refinery, increasing its annual oil refining capability
to 3 million tonnes from the current 1.2 million tonnes and contributing to product
quality and pollution reduction. Second, both companies are to launch feasibility
studies on a new refinery with a proposed annual crude processing capability of 10
million tonnes [51].
The ongoing trade and investments relations established in the energy sector
between China and different Latin American countries show an evident conjunction
of interests on both sides. However, there are two factors that should be taken into
consideration with regard to the relations established between the countries,
especially in the oil sector, since they constitute a limitation for them. One is the
distance factor and the other, the characteristics of most Latin American oil.
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While the security of shipping lanes is not a major concern for the Latin
America–China route7 and while the ongoing enlargement of the Panama Canal is
bound to facilitate oil imports from Venezuela and Brazil, distance remains a hurdle
from an economic viewpoint. In fact, the high cost of freight makes it more
interesting for Chinese NOCs to foster investments than to prioritise imports. In
addition, as most oil imported from Venezuela is of a heavy type, it requires a special
refining process. To cope with the increasing share of this kind of oil imports—not
only from Venezuela but also from other regions—and to improve overall refining
capacity, Chinese NOCs are involved in a number of projects to build refining
facilities, as well as in the acquisition of stakes in refineries abroad [25].
While neither factor has hindered the intensification of relations between Beijing
and Latin American countries, it is undeniable that any improvement in those factors
would allow further developing the potential of Sino-Latin American relations.
Lights and Shadows of an Uneven Relation
Conditioned by strong national interests, China’s foreign policy is craftily
implemented through a soft power8 strategy: the Chinese leaders use trade, foreign
investment, tourism, education and economic aid, mainly in developing countries.
This strategy has been combined with the slogan of win-win relationships. The 2007
White Paper on Energy reiterates the idea of ‘cooperation for mutual benefit’ and of
‘intensifying mutually beneficial cooperation in energy exploration and utilization’:
China works sincerely and pragmatically with international energy organiza-
tions and other countries on the principle of equality, mutual benefit and win-
win to improve the mechanism, expand the fields of cooperation and safeguard
international energy security and stability. [...] To ensure world energy security,
it is imperative to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between energy
exporting countries and energy consuming countries, as well as between
energy consuming countries [46].
As in its trade relations, another instrument used by China in its search for energy
resources overseas is the use of the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other states and the policy of no-strings attached. From the Chinese
perspective, its incursion in Central America holds another dimension: along with its
energy diplomacy, Beijing has political aims, namely to ensure the commitment of
foreign countries to the one-China principle. In this sense, the strengthening of
relations with those countries that already recognise the PRC is also used as a lure
for those that have not yet done so. As a matter of fact, since the split of the two
Chinas in 1949, Latin America has been the battlefield used by the PRC and the
Republic of China in Taiwan for recognition as the legitimate representative of
China. In this dispute for international recognition, we should note that most of the
states recognising Taipei are located in Latin America. Therefore, both the PRC and
7 Apart from the concerns about terrorism and piracy already existing with regard to sensitive straits such
as the Straits of Malacca, by which China-bound tankers travel. On this topic, see for example [2].
8 Soft power implies the ability to influence through persuasion rather than through coercion, i.e. using all
activities which are not within the scope of security, whether it is humanitarian aid, culture, bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy and economic investment. See (35, p. 1).
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Taiwan take advantage of the underdevelopment of the region to provide aid and
credit in exchange for diplomatic recognition. Moreover, Beijing’s pragmatic
approach to these countries may be seen, in a larger picture, as a structural response
to the international division of power, aiming at achieving a higher position in the
world hierarchy, challenging the current unipolar order based on the hegemony of
the United States.
Other reasons for the incursion of China in the Latin American area can be found
both in the countries of the region and in the United States. On the one hand, most of
the Latin American countries have lost confidence in neoliberal formulas. Instead,
criticisms of the Washington Consensus have strengthened and spread as a result of
the serious social consequences derived from the implementation of neoliberal
policies during the 1990s. The rise of the left in many Latin American countries9 in
recent years has led not only to disapproval of the neoliberal legacy, but also to the
search for alternatives which might offer more autonomy from the United States.
Many countries in Latin America share positive images of the PRC, tending to see
it as a friendlier partner than the West, and they admire the Chinese development
model. Therefore, some regional leaders have adopted strategies focused on
establishing commercial ties with Beijing as a way of diversifying exports and
reducing dependency on the United States. As a result, China’s incursion has
allowed the region to begin shifting its traditional energy partners—mainly the
United States, and to a lesser extent, Europe—introducing a factor of change in
economic and political relations.
Furthermore, the Chinese NOCs in Latin America chose the local NOCs as
partners, launching partnerships at the expense of the private energy companies
which controlled the oil sector before. With regard to this issue, Paul Isbell
comments that:
The simple idea that Chinese NOCs—possibly alongside, or in tandem with,
Russian NOCs—might be able to replace private international energy firms in
the development of energy resources in the Andean countries has been an
indirect stimulus to the renewed nationalisation trend evident today in
Venezuela and Bolivia (and to some extent Ecuador) which has private
international energy firms rethinking the logic of their activities, and even their
presence, in these countries [32].
Even though we do not share this interpretation of the presence of the Chinese NOCs
as a boosting factor of recent nationalization processes in South America, we do
admit that it has helped them. In fact, the development of relations between state-
owned or at least state-controlled companies allows negotiations and agreements
involving not only strictly energy-related topics but also other areas of cooperation.
Moreover, while this process of nationalization has put off some international oil
companies from carrying on or setting up business in the region, it has enhanced the
opportunities of Chinese NOCs. Thus, taking into account that American-owned
9 Although of different ideological backgrounds and orientations, in the past decade, the countries of the
region have evidently leaned towards the left with the investiture of Chavez in Venezuela in 1999, Lula in
Brazil in 2003, Kirchner and afterwards his wife, Fernandez de Kirchner, in Argentina in 2003 and 2007
respectively, Tabare Vazquez in Uruguay in 2005, Morales in Bolivia and Bachellet in Chile in 2006,
Correa in Ecuador and Ortega in Nicaragua in 2007 and Lugo in Paraguay in 2008.
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private companies are being replaced by local NOCs controlled by governments that
are looking for autonomy from the United States, it is necessary to look at how
Washington understands these dynamics.
In this sense, an interesting example can be found in a 2006 hearing before the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate on energy security in Latin
America. Among other general considerations, it pointed out China’s role as a power
player on the side of the state industries of the region. China’s state-to-state business
deals were considered to ‘reinforce the region’s tradition of centralized decision
making and anti-competitive practices’. Furthermore, concern was raised about
Chinese participation in off-shore oil exploration in Cuba [50].
In fact, we are facing a transition period from alliances of private energy
companies and governments which are sympathetic to the United States to alliances
of Chinese NOCs and governments that criticise the United States. In this regard, the
political evolution of the diverse Latin American states will be a key factor: as long
as governments critical towards the United States remain in office, their links with
China are likely to be strengthened at all levels−including the energy link.
Furthermore, since the investiture of President George W. Bush and the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has launched a global war against
terrorism which has moved Latin America down on the list of foreign policy
priorities. Although the recent change of president in the United States seems to be
conducive to a change in the approach to the southern neighbours, as recently hinted
during the Summit of the Americas held in Trinidad and Tobago,10 it is still early to
comment on how it will be shaped.
The two above-mentioned reasons allow us to conclude that the geopolitical
dynamics at the beginning of the 21st century created a framework favourable for
China’s incursion as a Latin American commercial and sometimes political partner:
the region is willing to diversify its international relations while the United States
has been distracted with other matters, observing expectantly the cautious but
constant Chinese advance.
This situation would not have been possible without the consent of the local
rulers. Eager to abandon the shadow of the United States and the neoliberal recipes
which have had such severe economic and social consequences, Latin American
political leaders have welcomed the ‘Beijing Consensus’11 without seriously
considering the negative impact.
There is much evidence of this positive attitude towards the Asian rising power.
Some examples from the main countries of the region may be illustrative of it. In his
visit of April 2009 to China, Venezuelan president Chavez showed his satisfaction
with the evolution of bilateral relations and the ‘building of a new geopolitical world
order’. In his opinion, Chinese measures against the economic crisis have been ‘very
positive for the world’ [16] and constitute an important step in the process towards a
multipolar world. Therefore, from this viewpoint, Venezuela and China’s relations
are considered to be a strategic alliance [21]. Brazil has also labelled its relations
10 With regard to this, see for instance [37] and [47].
11 The ‘Beijing Consensus’ defends a development model that contradicts the idea of political
liberalization or economic reforms as fundamental pre-conditions for longer-term development.
Instead, economic growth is stimulated through trade and investment in infrastructure and social
institutions (49, p. 15).
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with Beijing a ‘strategic alliance’. Having begun with former Brazilian president
Cardoso, the relations between the two nations have been strengthening during
Lula’s two administrations, especially since Hu Jintao’s visit to Brazil in 2004. In
2009, both countries agreed to further this strategic association, in order to better
cope with the crisis and to push towards a multipolar world order. Being both
members of the ‘BRIC’ group, they certainly share great interests in the
reconfiguration of the international order and may obtain important gains by acting
jointly on the world scene.
However, from the point of view of some political sectors in Latin American
countries, in spite of being an important commercial partner, China is in many senses
behaving as a new ‘conqueror’. In fact, leaving aside the specific case of energy
resources, trade with the region is eminently asymmetric and competition has begun
to take place with some countries in specific sectors. In addition, China has
displaced the region as the main FDI recipient. Thus, what at a first glance—and in
the official speeches—may seem to constitute South-South cooperation is increas-
ingly following the pattern of North-South relations. Beijing uses the slogan of
South-South cooperation as an alternative to Western aid in Latin America,
challenging the Western political and cultural hegemony in the world. As China
has grown as an economic power, the relationship has evolved to show a clear
attempt by Beijing to export its development model to its Latin American partners,
counter-balancing the models promoted by the United States and the Bretton Woods
institutions, which have not led to the expected results in Latin American countries.
China has been presented as a model to follow, but no steps have been taken to try
to imitate it. Former schemes of economic dependence are being reproduced,
impeding the possibility of taking advantage of the Chinese presence to blaze a trail
towards development. Consequently, the next years will be crucial for concluding
whether China has helped Latin America to redirect the course of its development or,
instead, has confined it to underdevelopment.
Conclusion
The fact that maintaining the rates of economic growth is one of China’s main
domestic priorities has resulted in a strengthening of the quest for natural resources,
especially energy, all over the world. This has led to the development and
reinforcement of links with some geopolitical regions traditionally seen as marginal,
which have become areas of vital strategic importance for Chinese interests. One of
these regions is Latin America, where Chinese investments in the energy sector are
increasingly important. Although at present they continue to be mainly concentrated
in the oil sector, steps are being taken in the gas market as well, and this trend may
be consolidated during the coming years. In fact, the so-called South-South
cooperation is increasingly more visible.
This paper argued that two main factors led to the growing Chinese influence in
Latin America: first is the fact that China needs oil and the countries in the region
want to attract foreign investment. Second, the distraction of Washington and its
obsession with the fight against terrorism after 2001 allowed other actors to find
space in a region traditionally considered to be the American backyard. At present,
140 East Asia (2010) 27:127–143
as demonstrated by the energy sector, the increased Chinese presence in Latin
America is allowing the region to experience important economic growth, which has
helped to reactivate and/or boost some national economies. In addition, it has given
many countries a bigger political and economic leeway with regard to those who had
been their traditional partners so far. Thus, it has contributed to their insertion into
the international system.
However, it is undeniable that, at the same time, this uneven relation between
China and Latin America is beginning to be perceived as detrimental to many
countries. The asymmetry of trade relations and the scarce attempts by Latin
American countries to forge ahead on a new development path seem to be hinting at
a ‘death foretold’. In this sense, the energy sector constitutes a good example of how
the economic attractiveness both for Chinese investors and local governments may
perpetuate economic dependence if not correctly tackled. So far, China is doing
better than the countries of the region, even though local rulers understand this as
being to their countries’ own benefit. It is still early to assert how the balance is
tilting, but there are good reasons to suspect that the trade-off in material and
political gains may be about to break down.
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